As it becomes increasingly urgent to address climate change, scholars have begun to explore how attitudes toward climate change are shaped, including the influence of messages people hear in the context of the ongoing climate change debate. What has not yet been addressed, however, is how these arguments might be affecting not only climate change attitudes (direct attitude change), but other environmental attitudes as well (lateral attitude change). To explore this possibility, two experimental studies were conducted in which participants read a message either supporting or opposing climate change action. Attitudes toward climate change, the closely related issues of recycling and alternative energy, and the distantly related issues of mandatory vaccination and gun control were assessed before and after message exposure. Results indicated that lateral attitude change (specifically, generalization) occurred for recycling and alternative energy, but not vaccination or gun control. Several possible moderators of these effects were explored, but were found to have only a limited impact. General implications for public opinion are discussed.
Introduction
Recent years have witnessed increasingly urgent warnings from the scientific community about the seriousness of a range of environmental issues, many connected to the broader issue of climate change. Indeed, assessments from the 2014 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) suggest that the effects of climate change have already begun to impact both humans and non-human species (Core Writing Team et al. 2015) . The projected consequences of climate change are also severe enough that convincing the public to take action has become increasingly important. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-019-02474-x Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-019-02474-x) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.
To this end, scholars have been concerned with the effects that messages people hear about climate change have on public opinion. The average person is probably exposed to numerous messages about climate change each week, both from media and interpersonal sources. Analyses of US network news programs, for example, have demonstrated that coverage of climate change has increased over time, from~21.3 broadcasts annually between 1995 and 2004 (Boykoff 2008) to~67 .7 broadcasts annually between 2005 and 2011 (Hart and Feldman 2014) . Hundreds of other news stories and blog posts containing the phrases Bclimate change^or Bglobal warming^are also published each day (Google News 2017), and people are likely exposed to additional messages from other readers and viewers. For example, Jang and Hart (2015) found that in the USA alone, over 6000 tweets about climate change or global warming are posted on a typical day.
Some important insights have been gleaned from examining effects of these messages. Several authors, for example, have explored the ability of self-reported media exposure or education to predict attitudes and beliefs (e.g., McCright and Dunlap 2011; Nisbet et al. 2015) . Other studies have focused on ways to influence opinions directly, by experimentally manipulating information exposure (Schuldt and Roh 2014; van der Linden et al. 2014) . Schuldt et al. (2011) , for example, found that reported beliefs about climate change differ depending on whether questions refer to climate change or global warming, particularly for Republicans.
As insightful as these lines of investigation have been, however, they remain somewhat limited in their focus. Specifically, only direct effects of these messages have been examined-simple effects of messages about climate change on climate change attitudes or beliefs. What has not yet been investigated is any lateral attitude change that might be occurring, whereby a message affects attitudes other than those targeted (Glaser et al. 2015) . In other words, it is unclear how messages about climate change might indirectly be affecting other psychologically related attitudes.
The focus on direct effects is understandable given that most persuasion research focuses on direct attitude change, although processes of lateral attitude change have captured the interest of several scholars. A helpful framework for understanding lateral attitude change was recently developed by Glaser et al. (2015) , who describe two possible processes: generalization and displacement.
According to Glaser et al. (2015) generalization occurs when an influence attempt affects both a target attitude and psychologically related attitude, either because of the automatic spread of an evaluation from one attitude object to another or because of conscious deliberation about the relevance of the message to other attitudes. To illustrate, suppose someone received a message about climate change. If the recipient felt positively about the message, they might change their attitudes about climate change (X), which might, through spreading activation, trigger changes in another environmental attitude (Y) without the recipient being aware of it. Alternatively, the recipient might reason that if they have changed their mind about X, then it makes sense for them to change their mind about Y as well. Either way, the result is observed attitude change on both the targeted attitude X and the related attitude Y.
Glaser et al. argue that generalization typically occurs when the target of a persuasive message is willing to affirm the advocated attitude change. For example, people may be motivated to accept an attitude change that is consistent with their existing attitudes (i.e., the message is pro-attitudinal). Alternatively, people might feel motivated to accept an argument from a majority source because they believe that the majority's position reflects objective reality (Mackie 1987) or because it is normative to do so (Moscovici 1980) . Displacement, on the other hand, occurs when an influence attempt affects a psychologically related attitude, but not the target attitude. Similar to generalization, Glaser et al. (2015) suggest that change in the related attitude occurs either through the automatic spread of an evaluation or conscious reasoning. However, changes in the focal attitude are also deliberately suppressed. Consequently, attitude change is observed for the psychologically related attitude, but not the target attitude. Returning to the example above, suppose that a message about climate change automatically activated both X and, through spreading activation, Y. A recipient aware of the attempt to persuade them about X might carefully monitor their attitudes on this issue and deliberately suppress attitude change, such that no attitude change is seen for X. Conversely, because the message's influence on Y is not salient, no monitoring of this attitude occurs; attitude change for Y is unsuppressed and can still be observed. Alternatively, a recipient resisting attitude change on X might feel guilty about ignoring a pro-environmental message, and compensate by developing a more positive attitude toward Y instead. Either way, the result is observed attitude change on the psychologically related attitude Y, but not on the targeted attitude X.
Glaser et al. assert that this process is likely to occur when someone is motivated to resist attitude change. For example, people may be motivated to avoid attitude change when a message attempts to persuade them of a position contrary to their own (i.e., the message is counter-attitudinal) or if the source of the message is undesirable for some reason, such as holding a minority opinion (Wood et al. 1994) . Because displacement creates an attitudinal inconsistency, however, there is also likely to be a delayed change that realigns the two attitudes. The focal attitude may later change to match the lateral attitude (i.e., a sleeper effect; Hovland et al. 1949) or the related attitude may return to its initial position (i.e., dissipation of initial change).
This framework has interesting implications for the climate change debate. Specifically, messages that argue both for and against action on climate change are common in political news coverage (Feldman et al. 2012 ) and in political debates (Glum 2015; Schulman 2015) . News organizations also regularly report both consensus and contrarian perspectives on climate change in an attempt to maintain journalistic balance (Boykoff 2008; Feldman et al. 2012) . Thus, even if viewers often choose to expose themselves to news that fits their own ideological viewpoint (Iyengar and Hahn 2009) , they are still likely to hear messages that both affirm and contradict their existing views. The question thus becomes, what kinds of lateral attitude change are occurring as a result of exposure to this diverse message environment? Glaser et al.'s (2015) framework suggests that whether generalization or displacement occurs depends on whether the target of a persuasive message affirms or rejects the advocated position. With an issue as politically contentious as climate change (see Dunlap et al. 2016; Guber 2013; McCright and Dunlap 2011) , it is reasonable to expect that people might be predisposed to reject messages that contradict their views, especially as they are likely to come from members of an opposing political party (Boykoff 2008; Feldman et al. 2012; Schuldt et al. 2011 ). However, this contention remains untested. As such, the purpose of this investigation was to explore the nature of lateral attitude change that occurs in response to persuasive messages about climate change, including the implications of these processes for public opinion and polarization on environmental issues.
Pilot study
Prior to the main experiment, it was necessary to identify attitudes that were psychologically related to climate change attitudes and were, therefore, strong candidates for lateral attitude change. To do so, a pilot study (N = 45) 1 was conducted to examine relationships between climate change attitudes and ten other environmental and political attitudes.
Strong candidates for lateral attitude change were identified using the procedure employed by Crano and colleagues (Alvaro and Crano 1997; Crano and Chen 1998) . These authors recommend identifying psychologically related attitudes using multidimensional scaling (MDS; Hout et al. 2013 ). This technique involves taking a set of paired comparisons among several concepts (called similarities), then using these similarities to arrange the objects on a conceptual map. When successful, the distances between objects on this map can be used as indicators of psychological relationships, with lower distances suggesting closer relationships. In other words, attitudes proximal to climate change attitudes in MDS space are expected to be proximal psychologically as well.
The MDS analyses were conducted in two ways. The first method utilized a paired comparison task (see Alvaro and Crano 1997) . Subjects completing this task (n = 24) were asked to estimate the probability that a change in one attitude would precipitate a change in a second attitude, for every possible pair of attitudes (110 total comparisons). Average probability estimates then served as one set of similarities. The second method employed a card sorting task. Subjects completing this task (n = 21) were asked to sort the 11 attitude objects into groups, such that Bissues that are similar to each other go together.^The percentage of subjects that grouped each pair of attitude objects together then served as a second set of similarities.
All subjects also filled out measures of their attitudes toward climate change and the ten other issues. Each attitude was assessed with eight or nine items on 7-point Likert-type scales (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). 2 Results revealed that participants had favorable attitudes toward most issues covered on the survey, with the exception of vegetarianism. Many of the attitudes also correlated highly with climate change attitudes. In general, the indicators of psychological relationships between the attitudes were consistent with one another (see Table 1 ). The two measures of MDS distance were strongly correlated (r = .81), and both had moderately strong associations with the corrected correlations between attitude objects (card sort: r = − .37; paired comparisons: r = − .41). All three indicators were thus examined when selecting candidates for lateral attitude change.
Based on the findings, two attitudes were ultimately retained for Study 1: recycling and mandatory vaccination. Recycling was selected as the strongest candidate for lateral attitude change, as it fared well on all three indicators of psychological proximity (r' = .65, distances = 0.18, 0.16). Mandatory vaccination, conversely, was selected as the weakest candidate for lateral attitude change, as it fared poorly on all three indicators (r' = .35, distances = 1.42, 1 Subjects were undergraduates at a large Midwestern university. The sample was predominantly female (62.2%), White (77.3%), economically (M = 4.49, SD = 1.40) and socially liberal (M = 5.22, SD = 1.30), and split between Republicans (37.8%), Democrats (31.1%), and Independents (28.9%). 2 Confirmatory factor analysis (Hunter and Gerbing 1982) was conducted to examine fit of the attitude data to the proposed 11-factor structure. The initial test of the model indicated unsatisfactory fit, but acceptable fit (given the small sample size, N = 45) was obtained by removing several items (RMSE = .09). Remaining items were averaged into a composite for each attitude. 1.41). Examining both attitudes provided the opportunity to examine whether or not lateral attitude change occurred both when it was expected to and when it was not, providing a test of Glaser et al.'s (2015) suggestion that psychological distance is a moderator of lateral attitude change.
3 Study 1 3.1 Method
Sample
Subjects for Study 1 were recruited using Amazon Mechanical Turk (mTurk), a popular crowd-sourcing platform (Amazon Mechanical Turk, n.d.) . One thousand subjects were recruited for the pretest, with the incentive that they could earn $1.00 for the pretest, $1.50 for the post-test, and $2.50 for the delayed post-test.
The average age of the sample was 34.96 years (SD = 11.14, range = 18-72). Most participants were White (75.4%) and male (52.4%) and had some college education (M = 15.56 years of formal education, SD = 2.49). The sample was restricted to US residents, and only 14 participants reported primary citizenship in another country. Politically, participants tended to be both economically (M = 5.18, SD = 1.58) and socially (M = 5.10, SD = 1.59) liberal. The majority of the sample identified as Democrats (44.3%) or Independents (32.2%), followed by Republicans (20.4%). On average, participants reported paying moderately close attention to politics (M = 3.69, SD = 0.97).
Procedure
The study was conducted online at three time points. First participants filled out a pretest survey on their demographic characteristics and initial attitudes toward climate change (the direct attitude) as well as toward recycling and mandatory vaccination (the candidate lateral attitudes). Distances were estimated using the PROXSCAL multidimensional scaling algorithm. Data exhibited good fit to a two-dimensional model for the paired comparisons (stress-I = .16, DAF = .97) and card sorting task (stress-I = .12, DAF = .99). Correlations (r') are corrected for error of measurement in both variables Approximately 2 weeks later, subjects were informed the post-test was available. Of the 1000 original subjects, 804 completed this stage of the experiment (an 80.4% retention rate). These subjects were randomly assigned to one of three conditions, in which they read an antiaction message, pro-action message, or no message.
At the beginning of the post-test, participants in the experimental conditions were told they were being asked to assess an opinion letter about climate change sent to USA Today by a credible source on this topic. Subjects were told the writer had degrees in political science and journalism, was a contributor to several politically neutral and environmental newspapers, and had published a relevant book. After reviewing the source information, subjects read a message either advocating or opposing action to address climate change. Both messages were constructed based on arguments that have been prevalent in political and news media. 3 Finally, participants filled out another set of attitude measures.
Approximately 2 weeks later, participants were informed the delayed post-test was available. A total of 718 subjects completed this stage (an 89.3% retention rate from post-test, 71.8% overall), but eight subjects provided insufficient information to match responses across time points, producing a final sample of N = 710. 4 At this stage, subjects filled out a third set of attitude measures, permitting examination of long-term or delayed attitude change.
Measures
The final set of attitude items for climate change (e.g., BTaking steps to reduce climate change is a good idea^), recycling (e.g., BRecycling is good for the environment^), and mandatory vaccination (e.g., BI am not in favor of mandatory vaccination^) was retained from the pilot study. Each attitude was measured with five items on 7-point Likert-type scales (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). 5
Results
In general, participants initially had positive attitudes toward climate change (M = 5.50, SD = 1.48) and the lateral attitude objects (recycling: M = 6.22, SD = 0.96; vaccination: M = 5.58, SD = 1.57). Message effects were examined with 2 (messages: pro-vs. anti-action) × 2 (attitudes: pro-vs. counter-attitudinal) × 2 (time points: prevs. post-test) mixed ANOVAs, using IBM SPSS Statistics 23. Mean attitudes served as the key dependent variable, and demographics were included as covariates.
Direct attitude change
The first analysis focused on message effects on climate change attitudes. Results revealed a substantial time-by-message interaction, F (1, 535) = 16.72, p < .001, η p 2 = .03. Specifically, climate change attitudes declined in the anti-action condition (T0: M = 4.63, SD = 1.23; T1: M = 4.56, SD = 1.46), but improved in the pro-action condition (T0: M = 4.53, SD = 1.27; T1: M = 4.96, SD = 1.50). Furthermore, there was a strong time-by-message-by-attitude interaction, F (1, 535) = 27.63, p < .001, η p 2 = .05. Messages were effective in changing attitudes of subjects for whom they were counter-attitudinal, but not of those for whom they were proattitudinal (see Fig. S1 in supplemental materials). Specifically, pro-action subjects were unaffected by a pro-action message (T0: M = 5.90, SD = 0.82; T1: M = 5.93, SD = 0.98), but persuaded by an anti-action message (T0: M = 5.89, SD = 0.83; T1: M = 5.45, SD = 0.99). Conversely, anti-action subjects were unaffected by an anti-action message (T0: M = 3.37, SD = 0.90; T1: M = 3.68, SD = 1.07), but persuaded by a pro-action message (T0: M = 3.16, SD = 0.89; T1: M = 3.99, SD = 1.05). Meanwhile, no attitude change occurred in the control condition over this period, t (146) = − 0.34, p = .734, r = − .03.
As a result of these effects, the sample became substantially less polarized between the pretest and post-test. Specifically, although anti-action subjects had much less positive attitudes than pro-action subjects at both the pretest, t (542) = 30.02, p < .001, r = .79, and post-test, t (542) = 19.93, p < .001, r = .65, the discrepancy between the two shrank substantially after message exposure (T0: M D = 3.36, 95% CI [3.14, 3.58], T1: M D = 2.70, 95% CI [2.44, 2.97]).
Follow-up analyses of delayed post-test data indicated that the effect of the anti-action message tended to decay, although the affected pro-action subjects still had marginally less positive attitudes at the delayed post-test than at the pretest, t (225) = − 1.79, p = .075, r = − .12. Conversely, the effect of the pro-action message endured; anti-action subjects retained their more positive attitudes at the delayed post-test, t (37) = 3.92, p < .001, r = .54. 6 As a result, the sample remained less polarized at the delayed post-test than at the pretest (T2: M D = 2.77, 95% CI [2.53, 3.01]).
Lateral attitude change
Following the examination of direct attitude change, the analysis proceeded with an investigation of lateral attitude change. For recycling, the analysis indicated that there was a significant time-by-message interaction effect, F (1,537) = 15.78, p < .001, η p 2 = .03. Subjects receiving a pro-action message tended to develop more positive attitudes toward recycling (T0: M = 5.92, SD = 1.34; T1: M = 6.09, SD = 1.34), whereas subjects receiving an anti-action message tended to develop more negative attitudes (T0: M = 6.04, SD = 1.30; T1: M = 5.60, SD = 2.27). In other words, the messages affected not just climate change attitudes, but recycling attitudes as well.
Examining this finding in more depth revealed evidence consistent with a generalization effect-subjects who exhibited direct attitude change (i.e., those receiving a counter-attitudinal message) also tended to be those who exhibited lateral attitude change (see Fig. S2 in the supplemental materials). Specifically, anti-action subjects exposed to a pro-action message (AP subjects) developed not only more positive climate change attitudes, but more positive recycling attitudes as well (ΔM = 0.28, 95% CI [0.04, 0.51]). Likewise, pro-action subjects exposed to an anti-action message (PA subjects) developed both more negative climate change attitudes and more negative recycling attitudes (ΔM = − 0.14, 95% CI [− 0.23, − 0.05]). Moreover, although this effect had mostly decayed by the delayed post-test for AP subjects, such that attitudes no longer differed from their pretest levels, t (37) = 0.79, p = .435, r = .13; it tended to endure for PA subjects, who retained less positive recycling attitudes at the delayed post-test, t (225) = −2.02, p = .045, r = − .13.
On the other hand, the pattern of effects did not provide any evidence of displacement. Subjects who exhibited no direct attitude change (i.e., subjects receiving a pro-attitudinal message) also failed to exhibit substantial lateral attitude change. Results revealed that neither anti-action subjects receiving an anti-action message (AA subjects) (ΔM = − 0.19, 95% CI [− 0.43, 0.06]), nor pro-action subjects receiving a pro-action message (PP subjects) (ΔM = 0.07, 95% CI [− 0.02, 0.16]) exhibited significant changes in their recycling attitudes over time. This finding is not particularly surprising given that displacement would not typically be expected in these conditions (as the messages received were pro-attitudinal).
Following the analyses of recycling attitudes, lateral attitude change on mandatory vaccination attitudes was also examined. As expected, results revealed no evidence whatsoever of a time-bymessage interaction effect, F (1, 537) < 0.01, p = .933, η p 2 < .001. In sum, generalization was observed only for attitudes closely related to the target attitude, not for more distant ones.
Path analyses
Overall, the preceding analyses provide encouraging evidence of generalization. Because the message included no mention of recycling, it is logical to assume that the observed changes to recycling attitudes were a result of spreading activation of climate change attitudes, as Glaser et al. (2015) suggest. Admittedly, however, the results do not necessarily rule out alternative explanations for the findings. Specifically, they cannot rule out the alternative possibility that the message affected recycling attitudes directly, rather than through generalization. To rule out this possibility, there must be evidence that the message effects on recycling attitudes are mediated by climate change attitudes.
Therefore, to test the generalization effect more rigorously, connections between the message, climate change attitudes, and recycling attitudes were examined using longitudinal path analysis. Specifically, the analysis focused on the two competing explanations of the results described in the preceding paragraph. The first was the generalization model, in which the message affects climate change attitudes directly, which then have an effect on recycling attitudes (e.g., see Glaser et al. 2015; Pettigrew 2009 ). The competing model was the direct effect model, in which the message has a direct effect on both climate change and recycling attitudes. If generalization does indeed account for the attitude change observed in the study, then the generalization model should fit the data, whereas the direct effect model should not. Otherwise, it becomes doubtful that generalization can account for the observed effects.
These two possible models were tested using PATHE statistical software (Hunter and Hamilton 1987 ). The generalization model fit the data quite well, χ 2 (3, n = 563) = 4.00, p = .261, RMSE = .06, and the predicted paths were all substantial (see Fig. 1 ). In contrast, the direct effect model exhibited very poor fit to the data, χ 2 (3, n = 563) = 13.67, p < .001, RMSE = .12. In sum, the results indicate not only that lateral recycling attitudes changed, but that they changed as a result of generalization following direct effects on climate change attitudes. 7 Notably, the same model also helps explain why the message failed to affect mandatory vaccination attitudes: the psychological distance was too great for substantial generalization to occur. This difference is demonstrated when the generalization model is tested with mandatory vaccination attitudes in place of recycling attitudes. In this case, the global fit of the model is still excellent, χ 2 (3, n = 563) = 0.41, p = .938, RMSE = .02, which suggests that the same processes occurred as for recycling attitudes: the message impacted climate change attitudes directly, which then generalized to lateral attitudes. However, whereas recycling attitudes were close enough psychologically to be meaningfully impacted by the generalization (β = .28), vaccination attitudes were not (β = .05). This finding provides additional support for Glaser et al.'s (2015) argument that psychological distance moderates the extent of lateral attitude change, such that proximal attitudes exhibit greater generalization than distal attitudes.
Discussion
In sum, the results demonstrate that the message had a strong direct effect on climate change attitudes, particularly when it was counter-attitudinal. Furthermore, these direct effects precipitated lateral attitude change on closely related recycling attitudes, but not distantly related mandatory vaccination attitudes. Longitudinal path modeling also demonstrated that these lateral effects were a result of generalization and not a direct effect of the message.
Overall, these findings provide important evidence relevant to Glaser et al.'s (2015) lateral attitude change framework. In particular, the results provide support for three important points:
(1) subjects who were willing to affirm a persuasive message did tend to exhibit generalization, (2) psychological distance was an important moderator of this effect, and (3) targeted attitudes mediated the effect of the message on lateral attitudes. Altogether, it is clear that much of the evidence falls in the framework's favor.
However, there were also some unexpected findings. Namely, counter-attitudinal messages were surprisingly persuasive, whereas pro-attitudinal messages were not. In other words, although the processes that occurred after a subject affirmed a message were as expected, the affirmations themselves were not. As a result, it was not possible to make convincing conclusions about displacement effects-because subjects were surprisingly willing to affirm a counter-attitudinal message, the necessary conditions for displacement were not met.
Study 2
Given the somewhat unexpected results of Study 1, it was desirable to conduct another study to replicate the observed effects and examine whether or not the findings would extend to other attitudes. In particular, all subjects in Study 1 had strong positive attitudes toward recycling, which resulted in restriction in range for this attitude. Therefore, it was anticipated that even stronger effects might be evident for other issues. Revisiting the results of the pilot study (see Table 1 ) suggested that alternative energy would be another strong candidate for lateral attitude change, as it too fared well on all three indicators of psychological proximity (r' = .71, distances = 0.30, 0.15). In addition to recycling, alternative energy attitudes were thus examined in this study. To bolster the findings of Study 1 further, it was also desirable to test another attitude for which lateral attitude change would not be expected. Revisiting the results of the pilot study indicated that gun control would be suitable for this purpose, as it fared poorly on all three indicators of psychological proximity (r' = .52, distances = 1.27, 1.40). Gun control attitudes were thus examined in place of mandatory vaccination attitudes in this study. attitudes; generalization model exhibited good fit to the data, χ 2 (3, n = 563) = 4.00, p = .261, RMSE = .06; direct effect model did not, χ 2 (3, n = 563) = 13.67, p < .001, RMSE = .12; path coefficients are corrected for error of measurement, *p < .05 Study 2 also provided the opportunity to build on Study 1 by investigating possible moderators of lateral attitude change, permitting a deeper understanding of these processes. Glaser et al. (2015) propose several such moderators, three of which were particularly well suited to investigation in the context of replicating Study 1. The first was preference for consistency, defined as Ba dispositional preference for or against consistent responding ( Cialdini et al. 1995, p. 319) . Glaser et al. (2015) suggest that people with higher preference for consistency may exhibit greater generalization, as they desire greater consistency among related attitudes. If so, there should be a stronger link between climate change attitudes and lateral attitudes for those high in preference for consistency than for those low in this trait.
The second possible moderator was source trustworthiness. Glaser et al. argue that a strong message will tend to cause generalization when it comes from a trustworthy source, but displacement when it comes from an untrustworthy source. This pattern is expected because people are anticipated to resist persuasion from an untrustworthy source more strongly than they would otherwise, resulting in suppression of direct attitude change. Because the message is strong, however, change on the unmonitored lateral attitude may still be observed (i.e., displacement). If so, then the source should moderate message effects on the direct and lateral attitude.
Finally, a third possible moderator was message unexpectedness. Glaser et al. suggest that unexpected information may cause greater lateral attitude change than mundane information because it has greater perceived diagnostic value. In other words, the Bhigher salience and recognition potential^(p. 268) of the information makes it stand out, which also makes its evaluation more likely to generalize to other attitudes. If so, there should be a stronger link between climate change attitudes and lateral attitudes for an unexpected message than a mundane message.
Method

Sample
Study 2 was conducted using mTurk, excluding subjects who participated in Study 1. As before, 1000 subjects were recruited with the incentive that they could receive $0.15 for completing the pretest and an additional $0.25 for completing the post-test. Ultimately, N = 964 participants completed the pretest, N = 479 of whom subsequently participated in the posttest. Several subjects (n = 47) failed to provide enough information to match their pretest and post-test responses, producing a final sample of N = 432 (a 44.8% retention rate). 8 The average age of the final sample was 41.60 years (SD = 13.46, range = 19-81). The sample was predominantly White (73.6%) and female (61.2%), and most participants had at least some college education (M = 15.36 years of formal education, SD = 2.63). Participants also had a moderately high preference for consistency on average (M = 4.76, SD = 1.04). The sample was again restricted to US residents, and only 14 subjects (3.2%) reported primary citizenship in another country. Politically, subjects tended to be both socially (M = 4.51, SD = 1.61) and economically liberal (M = 4.70, SD = 1.33). Most participants identified as Democrats (38.7%), with others identifying mainly as Independents (34.5%) or Republicans (23.4%). On average, participants reported paying moderately close attention to politics (M = 3.60, SD = 1.10).
Procedure
The procedure remained largely the same as in Study 1. Study 2 was conducted online over two time points. First participants filled out a pretest survey on their demographic characteristics and initial attitudes toward climate change (the direct attitude) and toward recycling, alternative energy, and gun control (the candidate lateral attitudes). They also filled out the measure of preference for consistency at this time.
Approximately 2 weeks later, subjects were informed the post-test was available. Subjects who agreed to participate were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: a trustworthy source, untrustworthy source, or no-message control. In both source conditions, the participants were first given the information from Study 1, to convey that the source was credible and competent. In addition to this basic description, however, the source biography also included information that his colleagues found him to be either Bhonest and candid^or Bmisleading and manipulative^in his writings about climate change. After reading the source information, the experimental subjects were randomly assigned to read either an anti-or pro-action message. Both messages remained the same as in Study 1 and were again presented as letters written to USA Today. Finally, participants filled out another set of attitude measures, followed by measures of author credibility, author trustworthiness, message quality, and message unexpectedness.
Measures
The final set of attitude items was retained from the pilot study. Each attitude was measured with five items on 7-point Likert-type scales (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). Preference for consistency was measured using the scale developed by Cialdini et al. (1995) , which includes nine items measured on 7-point Likert-type scales (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). Items capturing author credibility (4), author trustworthiness (4), message quality (6), and message unexpectedness (2) were developed for the purposes of the study. These four factors were measured on 7-point semantic-differential scales, with low scores indicating lower evaluations on each dimension. 9
Results
In general, participants initially had positive attitudes toward taking action on climate change (M = 5.60, SD = 1.51) and toward each of the lateral attitude objects (recycling: M = 6.14, SD = 1.05; alternative energy: M = 5.80, SD = 1.23; gun control: M = 4.78, SD = 1.76). Examining the evaluations of the source and message revealed that participants rated the author favorably on both credibility (M = 5.33, SD = 1.30) and trustworthiness (M = 4.69, SD = 1.57).
As anticipated, the trustworthy source (M = 5.20, SD = 1.56) was rated as appreciably more trustworthy than the untrustworthy source (M = 4.25, SD = 1.44), t (281) = 5.28, p < .001, r = .30; but the two did not differ significantly in perceived credibility, t (281) = 1.71, p = .088, r = .10. Furthermore, the participants rated the messages as high in quality (M = 5.04, SD = 1.63), but not as especially unexpected (M = 3.90, SD = 1.62). Not surprisingly, participants tended to perceive a pro-attitudinal message (M = 5.81, SD = 1.03) to be of higher quality than a counter-attitudinal message (M = 4.39, SD = 1.75), t (254.03) = 8.49, p < .001, r = .47; but ratings of quality were equally favorable for both the pro-and anti-action message when initial attitudes were taken into account. Interestingly, the anti-action message was perceived as more unexpected than the pro-action message, t (281) = 5.97, p < .001, r = .34, even when initial attitudes were taken into account. Altogether, results indicated that the source and message manipulations were successful: the messages were both rated as high in quality, though the anti-action message was perceived to be more surprising; and the sources were both rated as high in credibility, with the trust manipulation successfully producing differences in perceived trustworthiness between the two.
The analysis proceeded by examining the message and source effects with a series of 2 (messages: pro-vs. anti-action) × 2 (attitudes: pro-vs. counter-attitudinal) × 2 (sources: trustworthy vs. untrustworthy) × 2 (time points: pre-vs. post-test) mixed ANOVAs, using IBM SPSS Statistics 23. Mean attitudes served as the key dependent variable, and demographics were included as covariates.
Direct attitude change
The first analysis focused on message effects on climate change attitudes. Results revealed a substantial time-by-message interaction, F (1, 270) = 13.22, p < .001, η p 2 = .05. Climate change attitudes tended to improve in the pro-action condition (T0: M = 4.77, SD = 1.03; T1: M = 5.30, SD = 1.37), but exhibited no significant change in the anti-action condition (T0: M = 4.68, SD = 1.11; T1: M = 4.71, SD = 1.48). There was also a strong time-by-message-byattitude interaction, F (1, 270) = 55.79, p < .001, η p 2 = .17. Replicating the results of Study 1, pro-action subjects were unaffected by a pro-action message (T0: M = 6.00, SD = 0.82; T1: M = 5.85, SD = 1.02), but persuaded by an anti-action message (T0: M = 5.99, SD = 0.78; T1: M = 5.47, SD = 1.01). Conversely, anti-action subjects were not significantly affected by an anti-action message (T0: M = 3.38, SD = 0.85; T1: M = 3.94, SD = 1.10), but were persuaded by a pro-action message (T0: M = 3.54, SD = 0.87, T1: M = 4.74, SD = 1.12).
On the other hand, the source appeared to have little effect on attitude change. There was no significant time-by-source interaction, F (1, 270) = 0.33, p = .566, η p 2 = .001; nor was there a time-by-message-by-source interaction, F (1, 270) = 0.02, p = .888, η p 2 < .001; or a four-way interaction between time, message, source, and attitudes, F (1, 270) = 0.56, p = .455, η p 2 = .002. Counter-attitudinal messages were consistently effective, regardless of whether they came from a trustworthy or untrustworthy source.
As in Study 1, the sample became substantially less polarized between the pretest and posttest as a result of message exposure. Although the anti-action subjects had much less positive attitudes than pro-action subjects at both the pretest, t (63.35) = 23.53, p < .001, r = .95, and post-test, t (66.08) = 12.55, p < .001, r = .84, the discrepancy between the two shrank substantially (T0: M D = 3.31, 95% CI [2.98, 3.65], T1: M D = 2.47, 95% CI [2.02, 2.91]). Meanwhile, no significant change in attitudes was observed in the control condition over this time, t (148) < .01, p = 1.000, r < .01.
Lateral attitude change
The analysis proceeded with an examination of lateral attitude change. For recycling attitudes, there was a marginally significant time-by-message interaction effect, F (1, 272) = 3.37, p = .068, η p 2 = .01. Replicating the findings for Study 1, recycling attitudes tended to become more negative after exposure to the anti-action message (T0: M = 5.75, SD = 1.36; T1: M = 5.63, SD = 1.24) and more positive after exposure to the pro-action message (T0: M = 5.96, SD = 1.37; T1: M = 6.07, SD = 1.14). In addition, the pattern of effects was again consistent with a generalization effect. As in Study 1, the PA subjects developed both less positive climate change attitudes and less positive recycling attitudes (ΔM = − 0.20, 95% CI [− 0.34, − 0.05]). Likewise, AP subjects tended to develop not only more positive climate change attitudes, but more positive recycling attitudes as well (ΔM = 0.15, 95% CI [− 0.19, 0.48]), though this difference was not statistically significant with the smaller sample size in this study. On the other hand, no attitude change was observed for either AA (ΔM = − 0.04, 95% CI [− 0.38, 0.29]) or PP subjects (ΔM = 0.08, 95% CI [− 0.08, 0.23]).
The same pattern of effects was also replicated for alternative energy attitudes. Results indicated a significant time-by-message interaction effect, F (1, 269) = 4.99, p = .026, η p 2 = .02. Mirroring the recycling effects for both Study 1 and Study 2, alternative energy attitudes tended to become less positive after exposure to an anti-action message (T0: M = 5.33, SD = 1.36; T1: M = 5.15, SD = 1.24), but more positive after exposure to a pro-action message (T0: M = 5.59, SD = 1.25; T1: M = 5.73, SD = 1.14). Once again, the pattern of effects was consistent with a generalization effect. The PA subjects developed less positive alternative energy attitudes (ΔM = − 0.38, 95% CI [− 0.64, − 0.11]), the AP subjects developed marginally more positive alternative energy attitudes (ΔM = 0.19, 95% CI [− 0.10, 0.49]), and neither the AA subjects (ΔM = 0.02, 95% CI [− 0.28, 0.33]) nor the PP subjects (ΔM = 0.09, 95% CI [− 0.18, 0.36]) exhibited significant attitude change.
Finally, for gun control attitudes, there was no evidence whatsoever for a time-by-message interaction effect, F (1, 270) = 0.35, p = .555, η p 2 = .001. Replicating what was found for mandatory vaccination attitudes in Study 1, the generalization effects found for closely related recycling and alternative energy attitudes did not extend to more distantly related gun control attitudes.
Path analyses
Following the replication of the basic results from Study 1, path analyses were again conducted to examine the longitudinal causal models connecting the message, climate change attitudes, and lateral attitudes (see Fig. 2 ). As before, the generalization model and direct effect model were test for both recycling and alternative energy attitudes.
For recycling, results revealed that the generalization model again fit the data quite well, χ 2 (3, n = 283) = 1.53, p = .674, RMSE = .06, and all predicted paths were substantial. In contrast, the direct effect model exhibited very poor fit to the data, χ 2 (3, n = 283) = 18.01, p < .001, RMSE = .18. Notably, the magnitude of the generalization effect identified in this study (β = .37) does not differ significantly from the effect identified in Study 1 (β = .28; z = 1.41, p = .159), providing even stronger evidence of replication.
For alternative energy, the generalization model also fit the data well, χ 2 (3, n = 283) = 0.88, p = .830, RMSE = .03, and all predicted paths were substantial. In contrast, the direct effect model exhibited very poor fit to the data, χ 2 (3, n = 283) = 32.90, p < .001, RMSE = .21. Interestingly, the generalization effect observed for alternative energy attitudes (β = .60) was significantly larger than for recycling attitudes (z = 3.25, p = .001), which is consistent with the contention that restriction in range may have limited generalization for recycling attitudes. 10 Similar to Study 1, the generalization model also fit when examining the effects on gun control attitudes, χ 2 (3, n = 283) = 2.07, p = .558, RMSE = .08, with the distinction that the generalization effect was not substantial for this attitude (β = .11). The magnitude of this effect does not differ significantly from the effect found for mandatory vaccination in Study 1 (z = 0.70, p = .484), again strengthening the evidence for replication. To reiterate, this finding demonstrates that the same causal processes are occurring regardless of whether the lateral attitudes are closely or distantly related to the focal attitude, but that the distance moderates the extent of generalization. The generalization effect was substantial and significant for closely related attitudes (β = .37, .60), but not for a distantly related attitude (β = .11).
Tests of moderation
The final step of the analysis was to examine whether or not any of the proposed moderators impacted the generalization effects. This was assessed using stepwise linear regression, with 10 Reverse mediation models in which recycling or alternative energy attitudes mediated the effect of the message on climate change attitudes were also checked. For both, the message effect was nonexistent (β ≤ .01), indicating poor fit to the data. Global fit of the alternative energy model was also poor, χ 2 (3, n = 283) = 8.55, p = .036, RMSE = .07; and global fit of the recycling model was substantially worse than for the generalization model, χ 2 (3, n = 283) = 2.94, p = .401, RMSE = .07. post-test lateral attitudes serving as the dependent variable. Demographic covariates were entered in the first block; the post-test climate change attitudes, pretest lateral attitudes, and moderating variables were entered in the second block; and the interaction terms (post-test climate change attitudes × preference for consistency, source condition, and message unexpectedness) were entered in the last block.
For recycling, there was no evidence that the generalization effect was moderated by source (B = .02, p = .651) or by message unexpectedness (B = .01, p = .782), nor was there a statistically significant moderating effect of preference for consistency (B = − .04, p = .060). Similar results were found for alternative energy. There was no evidence that the generalization effect was moderated by source (B = .05, p = .276), message unexpectedness (B = .01, p = .401), or preference for consistency (B = − .03, p = .167). In sum, contrary to Glaser et al.'s (2015) predictions, there was no clear evidence to suggest that the generalization effects were moderated by any of these three variables.
General discussion
Overall, the results of these studies suggest that generalization can and does occur for environmental issues. Exposure to persuasive messages about climate change affected not only climate change attitudes, but attitudes toward recycling and alternative energy as well. Study 2 also revealed evidence that the extent of generalization was unaffected by some of the moderators proposed to influence this effect: neither source trustworthiness, message unexpectedness, nor preference for consistency had a meaningful influence.
These findings have both practical and theoretical implications. Practically, thinking in terms of the climate change debate, this finding indicates that messages people hear may indeed affect their broader environmental attitudes. These findings may also help explain why positive spillover (Nilsson et al. 2017 ) is sometimes observed for environmental behaviors. If proenvironmental messages can affect both targeted and related attitudes, it stands to reason that they may subsequently change more than just the targeted behavior.
Conclusions about broader effects on public opinion, however, are more difficult to glean from these findings. Specifically, although counter-attitudinal messages were successful in influencing attitudes here, this may not typically be the case. As mentioned previously, climate change remains a politically contentious issue, particularly in the USA (see Dunlap et al. 2016; Guber 2013; McCright and Dunlap 2011) . Previous research suggests that as people come to identify more strongly with a particular party, they also tend to view the opposing political party with more anger and bias (Mason 2014) , which is unlikely to predispose them favorably toward a message contradicting their views. Likewise, work on motivated reasoning (Lord et al. 1979) has demonstrated that people are often biased in their consideration of arguments, making them more likely to discount and disparage messages they disagree with (Manata et al. 2018) . In sum, the encouraging depolarization uncovered here may be the exception rather than the rule (though this concern is mitigated somewhat by the finding that the effect replicated across two studies).
This problem is also compounded by the tendency for people to expose themselves selectively to messages that fit their existing viewpoints (Iyengar and Hahn 2009 ). Specifically, depolarization was only found to occur following exposure to counter-attitudinal messages; if people typically avoid such messages, then there is little opportunity for these effects to occur. Furthermore, Republicans and conservatives have been found to have greater tendencies toward partisan selective exposure than Democrats and liberals (Iyengar et al. 2008) , which has in turn been found to result in greater polarization (Stroud 2010) . If Republicans and conservatives are less likely to hear counterattitudinal messages than Democrats and liberals are, any depolarization would likely result from a decline in Democrats' and liberals' attitudes toward climate change-hardly a desirable outcome.
On the theoretical side, the results provide preliminary evidence about Glaser et al.'s (2015) lateral attitude change framework. On the one hand, the results support the authors' claims that strong messages can consistently affect both targeted and lateral attitudes. Longitudinal path analysis also corroborates the authors' claim that generalization results from the spread of an evaluation from direct to related attitudes, as well as the claim that generalization is moderated by the psychological distance between the two. Closely related attitudes consistently exhibited generalization effects, whereas distantly related attitudes did not, as the authors predict.
In contrast, the findings indicate that the framework does not explain other aspects of the lateral attitude change process particularly well. For one, given their politically charged nature, one would expect people to reject counter-attitudinal messages about climate change quite strongly. Based on the framework, one would therefore expect displacement, not generalization, to occur in this condition. In both Studies 1 and 2, however, the opposite occurs. In order to be useful for predicting lateral attitude change, the framework also needs to be useful for predicting direct attitude change, but that was not the case for this particular issue. Furthermore, the findings contradict the arguments that source trustworthiness, message unexpectedness, and preference for consistency moderate generalization effects. Aside from psychological distance, it thus remains unclear what the important moderators of lateral attitude change are. Altogether, although some of the processes proposed by the model are supported by the evidence, more work is clearly needed to understand what other variables are relevant and how.
One possibility is that other moderators proposed by Glaser et al. are more impactful than those investigated here. For example, they suggest that people will exhibit displacement when they are highly motivated to resist attitude change, but generalization when they are not. If so, generalization may have been observed in this study because the design reduced resistance. For one, the message was presented as an opinion letter, so subjects may not have perceived it as a persuasive attempt (Petty and Cacioppo 1979) . In addition, the source was presented as politically neutral, which may have made subjects less resistant than they would have been with a partisan source. These possibilities would be fruitful to investigate in the future.
Another beneficial follow-up would be to explore the breadth of generalization effects by investigating other psychologically-related attitudes. Though Study 2 has taken a step in this direction by establishing that attitudes toward both recycling and alternative energy were affected, it seems likely that yet more attitudes may be influenced in the same way. Identifying these other attitudes would improve understanding of the extent to which the climate change debate may be affecting environmentalism in general.
Finally, another fruitful direction for future research would be to change the attitude targeted by the persuasive message. Given the importance of changing climate change attitudes (Core Writing Team et al. 2015) , and the potential for biased responses to messages about this issue, it may be more productive to target an attitude that will generalize to climate change attitudes than to target them directly. Conducting a study to explore this possibility might provide productive avenues for future message campaigns that indirectly work to improve attitudes toward climate change.
Despite the interesting findings uncovered in these studies, there are some important limitations. First, in the samples utilized in these studies, there were far more pro-than antiaction subjects, creating uneven cell sizes. In the future, it may be desirable to ameliorate this issue by oversampling anti-action subjects, at least when using mTurk. Second, the conclusions are tempered somewhat by the fact that some of the effects decayed over time. As a result, it is difficult to assess long-term effects of the climate change debate based on these results. It is important to note, however, that these studies focused on effects of a one-time exposure to a single message. In practice, people are exposed to numerous messages about climate change on a regular basis (Boykoff 2008; Hart and Feldman 2014; Jang and Hart 2015) . Such repeated exposures may reinforce the effects observed here, producing more long-term changes in public opinion. Examining effects of repeated message exposure in the future would help explore this possibility.
Conclusion
These studies provide important insights into the implications of the climate change debate for both climate change attitudes and other environmental attitudes. The results suggest that lateral attitude change can and does occur as a result of exposure to persuasive messages about climate change. Examining lateral attitude change in future studies of climate change attitudes will help improve understanding of broader impacts of the climate change debate, and may also offer useful new tools for improving public opinion toward climate change action.
